Why the Left in Power Cannot Tell the Truth

The Left has no difficulty telling the truth when it isn't in power.  In article after article, book after book, it reveals the way in which money and power inflict violence and humiliation on millions throughout the world.  Yet the very same people, once they become the communication directors for radical regimes, immediately begin to dissemble.  And the question is why.  My guess is that socialism, of most varieties, simply cannot deliver prosperity--or at least the illusion of prosperity or enough prosperity.  It can immiserate many people, but it can't deliver what most people want: status.  Much of the working class, far from being the heroes of equality, would be delighted to exchange places with the wealthy.  And then those who have attained power themselves become interested in status (if they weren't already), and so the Left must then begin to lie, to fantasize about what their regime is actually accomplishing or not accomplishing, to turn away from the inevitable jailings and killings, the misery and hopelessness--or to explain the violence as necessary (to prevent the return of the Right).  The Right also cannot tell the truth--even outside of power.  But when it is in power, it has the ability, to a large degree, to provide a measure of prosperity to enough people to ward off revolt.  At times, it becomes so greedy that it cannot provide prosperity--or it engages in endless wars that eventually destroy its own economy.  And then, at times, social movements revolt and place leftists in power.  And so on and so on and so on.  The Right can deliver enough prosperity because, to run a successful business, you have to have some sociopathic tendencies--a willingness to be ruthless and to believe that underpaying employees or screwing over your competition or even accepting discriminatory laws that refuse to allow others to compete with you are acceptable, even moral.

What's Often Nauseating About Humanity

Near the end of Bloodlands, Timothy Snyder's historical account of the state-directed massacres in Eastern Europe between 1933-1945 or so, he writes: "The human capacity for subjective victimhood is apparently limitless, and people who believe that they are victims can be motivated to perform acts of great violence" (399-400).  Amen.  Perhaps this ability is connected to evolution--perceived victimization leads to agression that allows a particular group to successfully pass on its genes.  And it operates on a more mundane, everyday level as well.  It's hard for people, virtually all people, to take responsiblity for their actions: both moral crimes and simple failures of planning.  It's easier to believe that failure was caused by someone else.  For Stalin, it was anyone he believed was undermining his efforts at forced collectivization; for Hitler, it was the Jews who somehow undermined his attack on the Soviet Union.  Since, by their own definition, they couldn't be wrong, someone else must be at fault--with murderous results.  This occurs so often in everyday life with, for the most part, obviously less violent conquences, and so I can understand the Catholic idea of the confession.  Yet there, immoral deeds--not necessarily errors of judgment or analysis--are waved away much too easily.  Pray to God--of course he forgives you.  But I don't want to suggest that victimization does not exist.  It plainly does.  But often people who have not truly been victimized of anything--or not victimized to any great degree--claim the mantle of victimization--and thus justify greater cruelty and violence.  It is at those moments when humanity most fully nauseates me.

Fortune and Providence

I read that, in the European Middle Ages, the Catholic Church would not allow people to refer to fortune as an explanation for success--only to providence.  Hence Daniel Kahneman: "Luck plays a large role in every story of success; it is almost always easy to identify a small change in the story that would have turned a remarkable achievement into a mediocre outcome" (Thinking, Fast and Slow, 9).  Yet most people would attribute their success, if they have experienced it, to hard work, ingenuity, or even a ruthless or sociopathic competitiveness.  Yet luck or fortune, not divine intervention, is the key--unless the game is fixed in which case even an incomptent white, say, can make it in a racist society.  But in a truly competitive society, luck may be more important than anything else.  Lack of success may often be bad luck--or just stupidity.

Eastern Europe

I'm reading Timothy Snyder's Bloodlands, his history of the awful, merciless slaughter of human beings in the eastern European lands contested by Stalin and Hitler from the late 1920s until 1945.  The methods: mass starvation ("starvation is resistance," Stalin tells us)--both for recalcitrant farmers in the Ukraine who resisted collectivisation or simply couldn't supply impossible quotas of grain and then for Soviet POWs left in pens and simply deprived of food by the Nazis--, outright executions, mass murder, shootings, gassing (in mobile vans and then in death camps), forced migrations, imprisonment. Both sides worked hard to eliminate the many lives they deemed unworthy of life.  Noteworthy moments thus far: the Ukrainian head of the NKVD, in his zeal to uncover plots against Stalin, dreams up a vast Polish conspiracy in the 1930s and informs Yezhov, the head of the NKVD in Moscow.  Yehzov informs Stalin, and then, after having thousands of Poles arrested and shot as imagined participants in this mass conspiracy, plays a "trick" on the Ukrainian head of the NKVD--arresting and executing him for not informing them of this vast plot earlier; 15 out of 25 heads of the Einsatzgruppen, special military units assigned to kill selected civilians after the Wehrmacht moved ahead, were commanded by officers with doctorates: one of their assignments was to kill off all Polish academics--the ultimate academic revenge; overcoming the "psychological barrier" of killing women and children in the summer of 1941 (Why is there never any psychological barrier for killing unarmed, defenseless men?); captured children in Kiev asking not to be beaten as they climbed into the gas vans; Hitler and his stooges believing that the mass murder of millions of Jews was actually part of the war effort, a meaningful war aim.  It goes on.  Can it be viewed as a natural phenomenon, much like a terrible storm?

More Dread

From Heinz Pagels' The Cosmic Code: "Suppose the unified field theory ideas are right and the experimental physicists will observe proton decay.  What does this mean?  The most profound implications are for cosmology--proton decay is the death knell of our universe.  Most of the visible matter in the universe--the stars, galaxies, and gas clouds--is made out of hydrogen, and the nucleus of the hydrogen atom is a single proton.  If protons decay, then the very substance of the universe is rotting away like a cancer that infects matter itself.  This rotting away of matter will, according to these unified theories, take a very long time: about a thousand billion billion (1021) times the present age of the universe."  Then, he reassures us: "We will have lots of time to explore the universe before it vanishes" (308).  So: you can't count on anything, not even protons.  Does it matter that "we" have this time?

American Exceptionalism

So many different groups of people claim the title, "The Chosen People," something that's an easily understood euphemism for privilege, that human life on the planet once again finds itself in another ludicrous situation. The obvious question is this: how can so many different groups be special--and not just special but the only special ones? It doesn't really matter precisely how any one particular group managed to get this designation, although it's often seen as a divine gift or responsibility: of course, that so many groups believe they are the privileged group almost inevitably encourages conflict with some other group, which may or may not make claim to the same distinction. Having a sense of privilege encourages people to think of themselves as the natural rulers of others (and defeating them creates slaves who can reinforce a feeling of divinely sanctioned privilege) or provokes anxiety when encountering another group making the same claim. Hence American exceptionalism, often seen as divinely bestowed on this country. Instead of seeing American power as mainly the result of viciously conquering a relatively sparsely populated land with a less technologically advanced population and of a continent filled with valuable resources (and at first a mostly pristine environment), many Americans, like so many other groups of people now and in the past, claim a divine mandate. (This undergirds the notion, often promulgated in commercials, that individuals deserve certain things.) There's nothing wrong, I suppose, with having confidence, though unearned confidence is always worrisome. It would still be possible to have a social democracy within American borders even with this sense of exceptionalism, although in much of American history we have made distinctions within the country as well, designating certain people as true Americans (white, male, wealthy, etc.) and others as natural serfs or even below the threshold of humanity. To criticize this tendency to see one's group (and, ultimately, oneself) as privileged is understood to be an act of existential terrorism, thus cutting off all discussion and analysis.

Privilege

One problem, of course, is how to reconcile the inherent human need for privilege and the possibilities of social democracy. Human history would suggest that, for the most part, they cannot be reconciled: we cannot find a way to be concerned about a more general social good and our own need to feel special, to feel that we have the often unearned right to something that others don't. De Toqueville in The Ancient Regime and the French Revolution argues that the revolution was not just an uprising that manifested itself out of the blue: French society was already changing during the years before the revolution, and the emergent middle-class and newly land-owning peasantry found the unearned privileges of the aristocracy unendurable, yet following the revolution, France quite quickly reverted back to a centralized administration. The French revolution didn't alter the fundamental cultural perspectives of the French: it just removed a heretitary government and replaced it with a middle-class bureaucracy, a system that already was in place before the revolution. The more things change, the more they stay the same. Meet the new boss--same as the old boss. Ok, when The Who function as meaningful sources of political understanding, we're in trouble.